Derrida interviewing Derrida: Autoimmunity and the laws of the interview by Long, Maebh
 Long, Maebh. ‘Derrida Interviewing Derrida: Autoimmunity and the Laws of the Interview.’ 
Australian Humanities Review 54 (2013): 103-19. 
 
 
Derrida Interviewing Derrida: 
Autoimmunity and the  
Laws of the Interview 
 
Maebh Long 
 
 
 
1: Later Derrida 
EARLY A DECADE AFTER DERRIDA’S DEATH, THE SENSE OF REMAINING IN HIS WAKE—
and at his wake—pervades engagements with his texts. Questions of 
legacy and following still abound, as inheritance becomes torn between 
re-examinations of Derrida’s concerns and readings of twenty-first century 
events through deconstruction. Following Derrida’s death, Michael Naas claimed 
that we are at the opening of a new possibility wherein Derrida’s work can be 
read ‘on its own terms, … without the spectre … of Derrida’s presence. … [It] is 
perhaps now possible as it never really was before to read his work without the 
phantasm of an author or a father coming to master our reading’ (9). For Tom 
Cohen, however, the father and his proper name remain claustrophobically 
present, as Derrida’s revenant continues to haunt his work, and to bring 
deconstruction dangerously close to ‘Derrideanism’ (Theory 98). Cohen argues 
that far from employing the opened space to bring deconstruction to bear on the 
twenty-first century, Derrida’s ‘family’ calcify Derrida’s texts by enshrining the 
father’s concerns:  
 
Derrida’s death spawned an ensemble of able and often admirable critical 
scion given over to talking about ‘ethics’, about ‘religion’, to exegetical 
commentary, to recuperation and stitching back, to almost outbiddings of 
mourning and friendship shaded into a quiet stupor of orthodox and 
N
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policing networks, to writing for one another, to its auto-immune phase. 
(Theory 156 n.14) 
 
This jealous guarding of Derrida’s legacy is, for Cohen, no more than a legitimate 
continuation of Derrida’s ‘obsess[ion] over the survival of his corpus’ (Theory 
97). This fixation, Cohen argued in an earlier essay, caused Derrida to fabricate ‘a 
“late Derrida”’ who could ‘enter into the main arteries of humanistic traditions … 
in order … to counter the entrapping clichés of him as anti humanist “post-
structuralist” (he saw what happened to de Man)’ (‘Geomorphic Fold’ 78). In a 
1993 interview with Bernard Stiegler, Derrida said: ‘I’m not under any illusion 
about the possibility of my controlling or appropriating what I do, what I say or 
what I am’. ‘But’, he continued,  
 
I do want—this is the point of every struggle, of every drive in this 
domain—I would at least like the things I say and do not to be immediately 
and clearly used towards ends I feel I must oppose. I don’t want to 
appropriate my product, but for the same reason, I don’t want others doing 
this towards ends I feel I must fight. (Ecographies 37)  
 
Derrida began to think about posthumous readings: in The Ear of the Other he 
speculates, specifically regarding Nietzsche, on ‘the line of credit extended to a 
signature, about delaying the date of expiration, about the posthumous 
difference between him [Nietzsche] and his work’ (23). Having argued that 
Nietzsche is not innocent of the National Socialist appropriation of his work—
‘There is nothing absolutely contingent about the fact that the only political 
regimen to have effectively brandished his name as a major and official banner 
was Nazi’ (31)—Derrida was not unaware of the ways in which his own 
signature and proper name could be posthumously employed. And so he moved 
towards a protection of his legacy, not only from detractors, but also from his 
inheritors. Cohen coins the term ‘Derridawars’ (‘Tactless’ 3) to refer to the 
struggles between Derrida and his academic heirs, arguing that in On Touching—
Jean-Luc Nancy we do not witness a gesture of connection or homage but see 
Derrida ‘tracking … a renegade off-spring, one who imagines himself to have 
surpassed deconstruction’ (‘Tactless’ 6). Cohen notes struggles within Derrida’s 
texts as he reacted to ‘betrayal’ by his academic family, who, in ‘wanting to be 
heir and official extension, wanting to build a more or less officious 
“deconstructive” network’ (‘Tactless’ 10) move too soon, too quickly, and ‘must 
be yanked back, reinscribed, exscribed, cut off and restituted, in a manner bearing 
on what might come “after” J.D.’s writing’ (‘Tactless’ 8). While Martin McQuillan, 
addressing On Touching in an earlier issue of Derrida Today, never expressly 
relates Derrida’s criticism of Nancy to a preservation of his legacy, his outline of 
Derrida’s analysis supports Cohen’s argument. He writes that ‘Derrida turns on 
Nancy some of the guns that are usually trained on himself by others (the self-
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deconstructing text, the transcendental reduction, the excessive word play that 
destroys the category) and lets Nancy have both barrels’ (210). In other words,  
 
‘There is deconstruction and there is deconstruction!’ … There is what 
Derrida does and there is a use of the term ‘deconstruction’ in an 
institutional context as an act of affiliation to a certain reading project but 
the work pursued under this name may or may not be any more 
‘deconstructive’, i.e. Derridean, than work going on outside it. (206) 
 
McQuillan’s argument implies a certain insistence by Derrida that deconstruction 
retain his name, his trace, and his intentions. Within Derrida’s texts is the 
struggle between a desire to prevent deconstruction from stagnating as 
inheritors repeat and ventriloquize the voice of the master, and the wish that 
deconstruction remain recognisable as Derrida’s legacy, and used as Derrida 
would have wished.  
 
This conflict within Derrida and deconstruction can be linked—perhaps—to a 
certain change within Derrida’s writing in later texts, although there are 
immediate and inevitable difficulties to any commentary on changes in Derrida’s 
style. In an interview given by Derrida in 1975 his hapless interviewer attempts 
to divide Derrida’s texts into three category types: 
 
theoretical or critical texts of a relatively classical form …; interventions on 
certain political or institutional questions …; and more wide-ranging texts 
which are unclassifiable according to normal standards … in which you 
implicate yourself, along with your ‘body’, your ‘desire’, your ‘phantasms’, in 
a ways that perhaps no philosopher has ever done until now. (Points 5)  
 
Derrida responds by outlining how, in the texts that have been classified as 
‘theoretical’, the demonstration is ‘constantly overrun, carried beyond itself by a 
scene of language, of counter-signature run adrift, of smuggled-in fiction 
(generally either unreadable or neglected) which affiliated it with texts that you 
have classified differently, with Glas for example’ (Points 17). The thetic is always 
contaminated by the non-thetic, and the ludic always contains the (falsely 
separated) serious. Furthermore, as Derrida denied that there was ever ‘a 
political or ethical turn in “deconstruction”’ (Rogues 39), it is extremely difficult 
to establish any definite progression or alteration regarding his work’s themes or 
periods. Geoffrey Bennington states that Derrida’s oeuvre, remarkable, he writes, 
for its consistency and diversity,  
 
cannot be divided into styles or periods: even the quite widespread idea that 
there are first of all very philosophical texts and then, after Glas (1974), a 
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more ‘literary’ and less ‘serious’ tendency, is doubtful as to its empirical 
accuracy and irrelevant to our understanding. (13-14)1  
 
While acknowledging this contamination, a shift in Derrida’s texts is nonetheless 
generally recognised; in Derrida and the Time of the Political, Pheng Cheah and 
Suzanne Guerlac ‘insist on a visible mutation in Derrida’s writings since the late 
1980s’ (6). J. Hillis Miller states that ‘Derrida wrote so much about politics in his 
last decades that it might even be possible to assert (not quite truthfully) that he 
became almost exclusively a political philosopher, a political theorist, or even a 
political scientist’ (229). The term ‘Late Derrida’ has featured in the titles of 
books, conferences and special editions of journals, and while a measured 
reluctance to periodise is generally exhibited, a general sense of transition and 
change within Derrida’s texts is acknowledged, both in content and in style. 
Phrases change; while the phrase il faut (one must) figures so extensively in his 
later texts that Elizabeth Rottenberg writes of ‘the never-ending, unrelenting “il 
faut” of deconstruction’ (Negotiations 1), in 1976 Derrida referred to it as an 
‘ethico-pedagogico-professorial prescription’ (Acts of Literature 19) that should 
be avoided. The ‘poetico-literary performative’ (Acts of Literature 55) is first 
used with approbation to describe an event in writing which gives space for the 
invention of the new, but gradually becomes associated with conformity and 
intentionality: ‘In the strict sense, a performative still presupposes too much 
conventional institution to break the mirror’ (‘Psyche’ 46). The ways in which 
difference and singularity are investigated change, as an overt ethical and 
political engagement takes precedence, and images of technology, medicine, 
justice, democracy and rights come to the fore. And the style changes: as elusive 
a point as style is, Derrida’s later mode of writing evinced, overall, a tendency 
minutely to examine the paths a term and concept might take, rather than 
performatively trace the steps along those paths. 
 
As Derrida’s career developed, the amount of time he spent reading, explaining 
and referencing his own texts also increased. The conferences and symposia at 
which he spoke were often dedicated either to Derrida’s texts or to specifically 
‘deconstructive’ readings, and so Derrida either explicated themes from previous 
works, or performed a deconstructive engagement. More and more Derrida tied 
his texts to previous texts, noting how paths taken in one provide a ghostly side 
road to another, so that, as Catherine David said in a 1983 interview, ‘To read 
you, one has to have read Derrida’ (Points 117). Readings of Nietzsche and Hegel 
become, as Eugenio Donato pointed out, a performance of ‘Derrida rereading Of 
Grammatology today’ (Ear of the Other 55). Texts and themes previously thought 
apolitical were revealed to have a political dimension—in Rogues Derrida states 
that ‘The thinking of the political has always been a thinking of différance and the 
                                                            
1 This was written in 1991; it is possible that Bennington is less definite about this now. 
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thinking of différance always a thinking of the political, of the contours and limits 
of the political’ (39). An excellent example of this re-reading and re-engagement 
is given by Samir Haddad when he compares a passage from The Politics of 
Friendship with a citation of the same passage in Rogues. In The Politics of 
Friendship Derrida writes that, with regards to democracy, the limit between the 
conditional and the unconditional ‘will have inscribed a self-deconstructive force 
in the very motif of democracy’ (105). In Rogues he inserts an additional note: ‘… 
will have inscribed a self-deconstructive force [I could have in fact said 
‘autoimmune’ force] in the very motif of democracy’ [emphasis added] (90). As 
Haddad writes, although he rather understates the case, ‘In thus suggesting that 
we today read “self-deconstructive” as “autoimmune”, in changing names, 
Derrida ever so gently brings the earlier analysis into line with the latter’ (511). 
Derrida citing Derrida inaugurated a new text. Derrida reading Derrida changed 
Derrida. 
 
Derrida’s texts operate in ironic, aphoristic relation to each other, each a 
foreword and an epilogue to another, each a reengagement and a rewriting, 
independent and conjoined. Each text is in counterpoint with every other text, in 
time and out of time. Each new text changes every other text, always a preface to 
a further fragment. Hence ‘Envois’ is ‘the preface to a book I have not [yet?] 
written’ (The Post Card 3), and The Politics of Friendship ‘resembles a lengthy 
preface. It would rather be the foreword to a book I would one day wish to write’ 
(vii). As Derrida’s neologisms and paleonyms increased in number and relations, 
a corresponding tendency to explicate and trace those connections is visible. The 
deconstructive interest in undoing and unsealing became not so much an act of 
engagement but of disclosure, of showing how the knots were tied. While Derrida 
could never be accused of presenting ‘easy’ or instantly accessible papers, the 
content of these pieces was often a performance of a deconstructive reading that 
operated to explicate deconstruction. Derrida, in a sense, demonstrated how 
Derrida would read the topic in question: Derrida performed Derrida reading. 
 
As Derrida was increasingly called upon to read Derrida in academic contexts—
and we must question if Derrida was the best reader of his own work—he was 
increasingly called upon to talk about Derrida in situations on the borders of the 
academic and the popular: the interview. It is extremely difficult to ascertain 
precisely the number of interviews Derrida gave—in For What Tomorrow: A 
Dialogue, Elizabeth Roudinesco estimates that Derrida ‘participated in 
approximately one hundred interviews’ (199 n.10), although Peggy Kamuf 
speculates that the number could have reached five hundred (87). From Points, 
Paper Machine, Negotiations, the numerous volumes that contain interviews, for 
example Sovereignties in Question, Who Comes After the Subject, Applying: To 
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Derrida etc., the film and screenplay, and online resources2 a sense of the 
increasing volume from his first in 1968 to his last, Learning to Live Finally in 
2004, can at least be ascertained. But regardless of the precise number, the 
interview was a forum that Derrida rarely engaged in without both a 
metacommentary on the form itself, and a certain distaste: ‘Ah interviews! Yes, I 
have always suffered from the laws of the interview. After several decades, I 
really must recognise that I have too often done what I said I didn’t like doing’ 
[emphasis added] (Paper Machine 136).  
 
This article looks at Derrida’s reading of the laws of the interview within his 
interviews, as he uses the interview to establish the interview’s inadequacies, 
and thereby find the excess within its limits. It then proposes that a certain 
contamination by those laws occurred in Derrida’s later works, resulting in a 
mode of exposure and confession that can be termed autoimmune. The 
autoimmune subject guards and exposes itself, protects and endangers itself, 
preserves and compromises all and a part. Autoimmunity is an inter-view, a 
critical look, a self-deconstruction, a view inside that undoes what it sees, 
Medusa turned on herself. Autoimmunity means that the entity turns on itself, 
and ‘must then come to resemble [its] enemies, to corrupt itself and threaten 
itself in order to protect itself against their threats’ (Rogues 40). As the later 
Derrida began to demarcate his legacy with increasing precision and exactitude, 
he began to cause deconstruction to turn on itself and step towards a certain 
antithetical immunity. 
 
2: Derrida on the Laws of the Interview 
‘On the whole,’ said Lévi-Strauss, ‘and all things considered, the interview is a 
detestable genre, to which the intellectual poverty of the age obliges one to 
submit more often than one would like’ (85-86). ‘What if’, asks Derrida, ‘all the 
questions put to me about what I write came down to fleeing what I write?’ 
(Points 10-11). The word interview comes from the old French entrevue, to have a 
glimpse of, and s’entrevoir, to see each other, but the mutual insight of the inter 
view is all too often no more than a ruthless overview, an oral summary of that 
which cannot be summarised and was designed for the page: ‘it is difficult for me 
to talk about it first of all because these texts explain themselves, in a mode that 
does not allow for the kind of verbal overview you have invited me to give here’ 
(Points 12). Derrida repeatedly expressed exasperation with a mode of 
unidirectional engagement whose price was ‘simplification, impoverishment, 
distortion, displacement of argument by symptom’ (Points 10), and whose ‘codes, 
demands, contracts, investments, and surplus values’ (Points 9) were those of the 
                                                            
2 <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jacques-derrida/bibliography/> and 
<http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/jdentre.html>.  
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consumer who has purchased a backstage pass on the understanding of intimate 
insights and revelations: ‘“An interview with Derrida? At last maybe we’re going 
to understand something about him!”’ (Points 115). The interview is ostensibly 
impossible, Derrida says, as it is ‘a law of genre that orders us always to make as 
if’ (Borradori and Derrida 135)—as if we are being spontaneous, as if the 
spontaneous were the truthful, as if truth can be so easily packaged. As if there is 
a live event, as if editing does not exist, as if presence can be unambiguously 
present on our pages or through our television screens. The codes of the 
interview demand revelation, confession, speed, accessibility, summary, and they 
present the illusion of presence, immediacy, reality and truth. They are 
phonocentric and logocentric, making manifest the latent, repressed or obscured, 
the media’s talking cure. But this truth and immediacy is, unsurprisingly, false, as 
the interview is ‘an extremely artificial device’ (Points 133), as ‘“live” 
communication and “real time” are never pure’, and ‘permit neither intuition nor 
transparency, nor any perception unmarked by interpretation or technical 
intervention’ (Negotiations 88).  
 
The interview strives to learn things by heart, that is, to assimilate the core or 
truth of an argument without the vagaries or defences of a supposedly deceptive 
medium—written language. It seeks to uncover, without prevarication, play, or 
extraneous detail, speaking plainly and directly, exactly what the interviewee’s 
intentions were, and what her meaning is. It presupposes a determinable, 
translatable, univocal meaning that can be uncovered and presented, simply and 
immediately. It presumes that the mode of expression is separate from the 
content, so that an idea presented in an ornate or elaborate style will remain the 
same when expressed simply and plainly. It thus makes it hard ‘to respect ... the 
indirect conditions or invisible detours of the question’ (Negotiations 91). Speed 
is the key—‘I’m going too fast, of course; surely I’m being unjust; the interview 
genre elicits that; I’d refine this if we had the time and the texts in hand’ 
(Negotiations 174)—as speed becomes truth, and the quick answer is the candid 
answer as it taps into meaning without the activity of the censor.3 
 
The interview presumes that ‘what is there is there and what is not is not’ (Points 
6). While the interview recognises the inseparability of the thinker and the 
thought, it attempts in a rudimentary, pseudo-psychoanalytic way—‘What was 
your father’s name?’, ‘How old were you when you left Algeria?’, ‘Do you have 
specific memories of that fear?’ (Points 120)—to explain the thoughts through 
                                                            
3 While the slow and careful route may, in a sense, multiply defences against the 
impromptu, the careful path will always contain improvisation. Defences are always 
betrayed. Improvisation—possible and impossible, as there are always filters and 
delays—is not something Derrida was opposed to. His stance was never against 
improvised responses, but against the presumption that improvising is somehow more 
‘true’. Or indeed possible. 
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the thinker. Thus, under the laws of the interview, deconstruction is x. And 
deconstruction is x because Jacques Derrida, among other things, ‘“was-born-in-
El Biar-on-the-outskirts-of-Algiers-in-a-petit-bourgeois-family-of-assimilated-
Jews”’ (Points 119-20).  
 
Antoine Spire asks, ‘Isn’t it necessary to simplify in order to spread knowledge? 
And when we simplify, are we absolutely and irreducibly led into betrayal? Do 
you think that all interviews are betrayals, because they can’t enter into the 
details?’ (Paper Machine 148). Derrida replies that, while simplifications are 
sometimes necessary to transmit knowledge, in general there must be 
preventative rules, or precautions, so that one offers ‘the best or least bad 
simplification’ (Paper Machine 148). In any text some simplification will always 
occur, as one can never present, in perfect detail, every aspect of each case. And, 
‘perhaps, perhaps, it is better to simplify a little while letting something get 
through, like contraband, rather than to be silent with the excuse that one can 
never be equal to the complexity of things’ (Paper Machine 149). In betrayal 
arising from simplification, one hopes that a measure of ‘truth’ slips in between 
the glances. The good interview, with the least bad simplification, points the 
receiver elsewhere, towards the longer, less simplified texts, and does not 
presume to be an end in itself. Derrida’s slow weaving through a textual web may 
seem like an attempt to ‘bog down the interview, to paralyze it’ (Points 37), but is 
rather an attempt to step in a different direction, and create a new event. As 
Derrida says, evoking Heidegger, 
 
What matters is the trajectory, the pathway, the crossing—in a word, the 
experience. The experience is then the method, not a system of rules or 
technical norms. … In an interview, even if one repeats the same thing, the 
same ‘contents’—even so, the situation, the context, the mode of address, 
the addressees, and the signature are all different every time, and it’s the 
impromptu of this ‘situation’ that is what the reader or listener is waiting 
for, I suppose. Otherwise, it is always better to read the books. (Paper 
Machine 137)  
 
The ‘good’ interview must be an event, a different path, an experience. It must be 
recognised as a plurality of voices, a multiplicity of addresses and addressees. 
Not a direct presentation of a univocal truth achieved through plain speech, 
pithy, quotable summaries and touching biographical reminiscences. 
 
The press interview is thus clearly, if problematically, distinguished from the 
polylogues that Derrida wrote himself, the dialogues held with other thinkers, 
the questions asked at the end of papers, and the round-table discussions. How 
the interview might break out from its limitations is performed in the ‘interview’ 
Derrida wrote for Le Monde in 1982, in which he pretends to be interviewed by, 
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we presume, the editor Christian Delacampagne. While Derrida retains the basic 
position of interviewee the contribution made by the questioner greatly 
outweighs the normal patter—the questioner is erudite, familiar with Derrida’s 
style and way of reading, and willing to debate and digress. But the phonocentric 
preference of the interview is not lost—the interviewer suggests that Derrida 
‘dictate [his] books over the telephone’ (Points 174), and the delayed, edited, 
mediated presence of the interview is thereby remarked upon. But in the space 
permitted by a learned and knowledgable partner, Derrida is able to discuss the 
performative, the privileging of speech over writing, of plain language over the 
academic, of the specialised over the general, and end with the break-down of 
the (telephone) line and the refusal to recognise the spoken event as the final 
text.  
 
The film Derrida, which primarily comprises interviews, moves even closer 
towards the ‘least bad’ interview. As the co-director Amy Ziering Kofman 
explains, ‘It was never of interest to me to make a film about ‘who Jacques 
Derrida is’ and present a narrative of his life’ (Dick and Kofman 129). Derrida 
attempts to side-step the laws of the interview, to step away from univocal 
meaning, from ‘a conventional PBS or BBC type documentary narrative that 
biographically recount[s] facts about Derrida’s life in a standard documentary 
fashion’ (Dick and Kofman 23). Instead, Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick create a 
work that is both public and private, academic and anecdotal. A biography on 
Derrida, inheriting from Derrida an approach to Derrida and to biography. 
Derrida moves slowly, containing meandering shots accompanied by Ziering 
Kofman’s otherworldly voiceovers from Derrida’s texts. It questions 
representation, and problematises the subject and the means of the biography, 
knowing that, as Dick says, the work cannot present Jacques Derrida, at home, 
unplugged, and instead ‘creates a doppelganger of the subject’ (Dick and Kofman 
47), a portrait of the artist who answers the question but who comes no closer to 
an ultimate truth. Instead it presents a fragmented, fractal subject(ile), a lower  
case ‘i’. This ‘i’ is mirrored in the title of the volume of the screenplay: Derrida is 
written in large, white letters, with the exception of the ‘i’, which is in gold. The 
subject, always in lower case, is off-centre, a subjectile, and yet always a focus, a 
draw, a distraction. It glitters, it is and is not gold. It is an interview, and it is not. 
 
Within the interview, Derrida says, even in its most naive formulation, it is 
expected that he will ‘defend, justify, consolidate things I have done these last 
years. ... And even if I were to indicate, in an autocritical mode, such and such a 
limit, or negative aspect, or strategic weakness, would anyone be duped by the 
manoeuvre of reappropriation?’ (Points 10). The interview, as imparting the 
immediacy of phonē and the permanence of truth, is broken down by Derrida 
within the interviews—his comments on their laws work to reveal their very 
impossibility. It also reveals that the interview presumes upon a certain defence 
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and reappropriation. It is precisely that delimiting and gathering back that 
Derrida assimilates into his later texts in an auto-immune act that turns his texts 
towards the immune. 
 
3: Autoimmunity 
In Spectres of Marx Derrida writes: 
 
the living ego is auto-immune. To protect its life, to constitute itself as 
unique living ego … it must … take the immune defences apparently meant 
for the non-ego, the enemy, the opposite, the adversary and direct them at 
once for itself and against itself. (177) 
 
In Rogues Derrida describes autoimmunity as the ‘strange illogical logic by which 
a living being can spontaneously destroy, in an autonomous fashion, the very 
thing within it that is supposed to protect it against the other, to immunize it 
against the aggressive intrusion of the other’ (123). The strange, illogical logic of 
the ‘autoimmune contradiction or counterindication’ (Rogues 83) is a step ‘both 
self-protecting and self-destroying, at once remedy and poison’ (Borradori and 
Derrida 124)—the contradictory force of weakness that operates within a 
structure and causes it to undo or attack (part of) itself. Autoimmunity is the 
‘double bind of threat and chance, not alternatively or by turns promise and/or 
threat but threat in the promise itself’ (Rogues 82). It is a force of weakness, a 
suicidal drive of threat and chance, promise and perjury, of (ir)responsibility.  
 
Derrida argues in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ that religion’s denial and use of 
technology demonstrates an autoimmune relation. Religion is of the heilig, the 
holy, of the ‘pure, non-contaminated, untouched, the sacred’ (‘Faith and 
Knowledge’ 61), that which is—or should be—immune from the contaminations 
of reproduction. And yet religion ‘is immediately transmitted, massively 
“marketed” and available on CD-ROM’ (‘Faith and Knowledge’ 62); it reproduces 
and disseminates itself through the (impure) technology of iterability. Religion 
depends upon the unsound and contaminated—this impurity is at its ‘core’—and 
yet it condemns and attacks this part of itself as if it were separate and other: 
 
all self protection of the unscathed, of the safe and sound, of the sacred 
(heilig, holy) must protect itself against its own protection, its own police, its 
own power of rejection, in short against its own, which is to say, against its 
own immunity. It is this terrifying but fatal logic of the auto-immunity of the 
unscathed. (‘Faith and Knowledge’ 79-80) 
 
Derrida’s first prolonged engagement with autoimmunity specifically engages 
with technology and the media, with globalisation and ‘tele-technoscience’ noted 
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as that which is both utilised and condemned. When technology is attacked by 
religion, religion is seen to effectively launch an attack on itself—an attack on a 
part of itself that it has designated other. And while this attack is fatal, 
‘autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. It enables an exposure to the other, to 
what and to who comes—which means that it must remain incalculable. Without 
autoimmunity, with absolute immunity, nothing would ever happen or arrive’ 
(Negotiations 152). Autoimmunity is the aporia that opens another path, that has 
‘an internal contradiction, an indecidability, that is, an internal-external, 
nondialectisable antinomy that risks paralyzing and thus calls for the event of the 
interruptive decision’ (Negotiations 35). 
 
In Rogues Derrida links autoimmunity to democracy, which he understands as 
improper, mutable, elusive and undecidable, always insufficient to meet its own 
needs and demands, pervertible and perfectible.4 He uses the example of the 
1992 Algerian elections, in which democratic elections were halted as the 
government felt that the electoral process would end—democratically—in the 
cessation of democracy. Similarly, in response to the September 11 attacks, the 
American government restricted its own freedom and democratic processes, 
deciding, in order to save democracy and freedom, to temporally suspend (a 
degree of) democracy and freedom. In so doing it added friendly fire to the loss 
of life. In protecting itself, democracy turns on itself, and ‘must then come to 
resemble these enemies, to corrupt itself and threaten itself in order to protect 
itself against their threats’ (Rogues 40). 
 
Derrida argues that freedom and sovereignty always presume an empowered 
self with a certain power to decide, to speak for itself and know itself.5 But as 
soon as the sovereign self tries to place itself or explain itself, it begins the 
process of autoimmunity. In defining itself, sovereignty/the self/democracy 
opens itself up to counter-interpretations that dissolve any conceptualisation of 
the entity as in possession of an absolute ‘natural’ right or essence. The 
autoimmune process thus does not simply consist in attacking one’s own 
defences, a murder/suicide,  
 
                                                            
4 Democracy is hence  better reinscribed, Derrida writes, as the democracy to come.  
Democracy to come has the structure of a promise, but a promise/perjury, an aporetic 
‘force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability 
and incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and 
divisible or shared sovereignty’ (Rogues 86). Democracy to come is autoimmune, 
overstepping itself, transgressing itself. It is a different thinking of the event, an event 
that is unique and unforeseeable. A mondalization, a thinking beyond national borders, 
of justice, and of self-criticism. 
5 As Derrida points out, too often the self so in command of itself is ‘master in the 
masculine: the father, husband, son, or brother, the proprietor, owner or seignior’ 
(Rogues 12). 
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but in compromising the self, the autos—and this ipseity. It consists not only 
in committing suicide but in compromising sui- or self-referentiality, the self- 
or sui- of suicide itself. Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, more 
seriously still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning and 
supposed integrity. (Rogues 45) 
 
Suicide may kill a body, but autoimmune suicide does away with the very 
concept of a self, annihilating suicide as there is no longer a self present enough 
to itself to take its own life.  
 
4: The Autoimmune Interview 
As Derrida grew concerned about his legacy, his texts began to take on the 
weight of his re-reading and re-marking them. But this re-engagement is not so 
much a re-writing as a re-assimilation—a defence, a justification, a 
consolidation—and as such the structure exhibited is that of an interview—
Derrida reading Derrida is Derrida interviewing Derrida, and asking himself 
questions such as ‘How would you demarcate your corpus?’... ‘Describe how you 
would distance yourself from the misreading of detractors and protégées.’... 
‘Could you expand on how you would extend deconstruction into fields of the 
political and the ethical?’... In outlining a legacy through the auto-interview—
albeit an interview deconstructed and transgressed—deconstruction turns on 
itself, reading itself through the structure of its other: so much do the laws of the 
interview concentrate on orality and presence, immediacy and psychobiography 
that deconstruction’s antithesis may well be named interview. Thus, in moving 
towards a plain defence and delimitation of deconstruction Derrida causes it to 
take on traits of its opposite, of its ‘enemies, to corrupt itself and threaten itself in 
order to protect itself against their threats’ (Rogues 40). Thus in interviewing 
himself Derrida performs the tautology/paradox of an autoimmune self-
deconstruction; ‘a self-deconstructive (auto-déconstructrice) force (I could have 
in fact said ‘autoimmune’ force)’ (Rogues 90). A self-deconstructive force is an 
autoimmune force, as it means that part of the text—a term, a trope, a thesis—
turns on the text, or the text itself breaks itself down, that is, pushes itself to an 
interruptive transgressive excess, by opening itself to itself-as-other.  
 
In self-deconstructing, the text autoimmunely turns on itself, threatening itself 
through interruption by and conjoining with its opposite. This invasion from 
within is not heterogeneous to deconstruction, since deconstruction, like 
democracy, has to be autoimmune in order to be itself. But being itself opens it to 
the undoing of itself. Deconstruction, like religion, needs technology, iterability 
and the interview’s modes of presentation, authorship, and summary in order to 
be itself, and thus interrupts and turns from itself. If autoimmunity is ‘that 
strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, “itself” works to 
 Australian Humanities Review 54 (May 2013) 115 
 
destroy its own protection, to immunise itself against its “own” immunity’ 
(Borradori and Derrida 94), in the case of deconstruction an ironic twist occurs 
that turns autoimmunity on itself. The (ir)responsibility that is deconstruction is 
forced to comply with certain legal and social ‘responsibilities’—present your 
work accessibly, systematise and sign your text simply and on the dotted line—
and thereby become responsible. However, this form of logocentric, reductive 
responsibility is—should be—an anathema to deconstruction, and so becoming 
‘responsible’ in this sense is, for deconstruction, an autoimmune response of 
irresponsibility, which pushes the non-method of deconstruction closer to a 
method.6 If deconstruction involves a turning towards radical difference, 
deconstruction then becomes open to closure, welcoming of method, convivial 
with phonocentrism, and cosy with the interview. In other words, deconstruction 
tends towards what it is not, that is, towards the protected, safeguarded, hostile 
immune. 
 
The countersignature of the other—even when the other bears the same name—
comes ‘to lead it [the text] off elsewhere, so running the risk of betraying it’ (Acts 
of Literature 69). Thus the countersignature of the other is an autoimmune act: 
‘you have to give yourself over singularly to singularity, but singularity then does 
have to share itself out and so compromise itself, promise to compromise itself’ 
(Acts of Literature 69). Each text is autoimmune, an auto-interpretation or self-
critique that both turns every text into a writing of the self, and in that process 
undoes the self. The signature signs the contamination of the self and the other, 
as each text is undersigned by the self, a signature that is already a signing of 
alterity. But under the laws of the interview, autoimmunity turns on itself, and 
the signing of alterity and the subjectile becomes an (attempted) signing of 
immunity by a pure, autonomous subject. The auto-interviewing of Derrida’s 
work requires that deconstruction present a Thinker, a responsible subject to 
whom questions can be directed, and from whom explanations and accessible 
summaries can be gleaned. This is not, of course, to imply that the interview is 
alone in provoking the demand for a responsible, authoritative signature, but 
that the interview is premised on taking the signature, so to speak, and making it 
account for itself. If every text is haunted by a signature, an interview is séance, a 
making-present of an absent signatory. If deconstruction was an autoimmune ‘i’, 
under the laws of the interview, and towards the end of Derrida’s career, 
deconstruction turned on itself and began to move towards the immune ‘I’. The 
self (re)born from interviews is a different self, but a self moving away from 
difference and the signature of the other, and towards the same, as inter-view is 
forcibly stabilised as interview. The auto-interview is thus symptomatic of a 
                                                            
6 This autoimmunity operates both in terms of the attack on part of the self outlined in 
‘Faith and Knowledge’—Derrida in autoimmune relation to the section of himself that is 
deconstruction—and the attack on the ‘whole’ self in Rogues—Derrida/deconstruction 
in autoimmune relation to Derrida/deconstruction. 
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certain jealousy—a certain blindness—and a rather more zealous protection of 
the legacy, as deconstruction moves away from being ‘what happens’ (a 
formulation Derrida frequently repeated), to being ‘what happens when Derrida 
reads’. Derrida shows concerns with the survival of his texts, and the living on of 
a deconstruction in his name and underwritten by him. The insistence on 
continued existence in recognisable form meant that the later Derrida was less 
open to openness, less willing to follow arbitrary paths, more eager to detail and 
explain and present. In the drive to survive, Derrida turns deconstruction 
towards certain laws of the interview, and deconstruction autoimmunely 
becomes immune. 
 
In a 1983 interview Anne Berger said to Derrida: ‘I don’t know if I’m addressing 
the man or the “writer-thinker”, I don’t know what their relation is’ (Points 132). 
Their relation, Derrida has shown us, is one of mutual, dynamic contamination, 
as the public and the private Derrida merge together. As Derrida stated 
repeatedly, 
 
I do not believe in the conceptual value of a rigorous distinction between the 
private and the public. There can be the singular and the secret, but these 
resist the ‘private’ as much as they do the ‘public’. In what I write one should 
be able to perceive that the boundary between the autobiographical and the 
political is subject to a certain strain. (Negotiations 17-18) 
 
The contamination between categories and the gathering that so fascinated 
Derrida generates its own autoimmune problems. An autobiographical, 
confessional text requires the bringing together of all the threads that explain, 
expose, present and re-present the self. It presumes upon the existence of a pre-
existent subject which then outlines its own story. But not only does the act of 
gathering conjoin the threads of the other, it also assembles threads of events 
that never took place: ‘Still today there remains in me an obsessive desire to save 
in uninterrupted inscription, in the form of a memory, what happens—or fails to 
happen’ (Acts of Literature 34). The gathering attempts to present a stable, 
unified, self-present self, but by gathering truth, truth is produced, events are 
changed. The self that gathers is wholly different to the selves that are gathered: 
 
There is not a constituted subject that engages itself at a given moment in 
writing for some reason or another. It is given by writing, by the other: born 
as we were bizarrely saying a moment ago, born by being given, delivered, 
offered, and betrayed all at once. (Points 347) 
 
Thus the self preserved is a different self, and the self that interviews a different 
self again. There is a blind spot as one reflects, an invisible trait that cannot be 
captured as one looks at oneself looking. The Augenblick, the blinking of 
difference is ‘the law of the inter-view’ (Memoirs of the Blind 55), and very much a 
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blind view. Preserving and gathering is suicide, but within the interview takes 
the form of a death masquerading as life, a false survival of the preserved 
undead. 
 
The later Derrida is a Derrida in interview, asking himself questions that lead to 
immune signatures and revenants of presence. The result was an autoimmune 
relation at the ‘heart’ of deconstruction, and thus the legacy left to us to inherit is 
the contaminated and competing binary of deconstruction/Derrida studies. 
While autoimmunity may be self-deconstruction (Rogues 90), the self-
deconstruction of deconstruction turns the wheel back to metaphysics of 
presence, and immunity. 
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